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I. INTRODUCTION
International lawyers generally agree that if a right of self-
determination exists in international law,' it is exhausted once the
process of decolonization ends." The basic argument for this view
relates to international security: to preserve the stability engen-
dered by an international order based on a system of states, self-
determination must not be extended beyond the context of de-
colonization to include a right of secession to minority groups. It is
argued that the continued existence of the principle would legiti-
mize the right of secession. As a result, states with a plurality of
ethnic groups would be subject to the constant threat of secession.
Because claims to secession often are asserted violently, other
states might be tempted to intervene militarily to enhance their
influence. The fear that internal strife may be an avenue by which
major powers spread their influence or weaken their enemies is a
real one. The promotion of a separate Baluchistan in Pakistan, or a
Kurdistan in Iran, would have serious effects on those states and
on their regions. Another reason for denying the right of self-
determination following decolonization is that the concept of state
sovereignty would be weakened. This concept reflects the posi-
tivist notion that only states are subject to international law and
*LL.B. (Ceylon), LL.M. (Yale), Ph.D. (London); Senior Lecturer in Law, University of
Tasmania, Australia.
' Some lawyers doubt the existence of the right. See Green, Self-Determination and the
Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 40 (1971); Rostow, The
Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 272, 272 n.2
(1975). However, recent literature accepting the existence of the right is extensive. See L.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); J. CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 247-70 (1979); R. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION
OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1973); D. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1972); Chen, Self-Determination, in TOWARDS WORLD ORDER (M. Reisman &
B. Weston eds. 1976); Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 779 (1976).
'See R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 90-106 (1963); Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 459 (1971). Emerson observed: "[T]he room left for self-determination in the sense of at-
tainment of independent statehood is very slight, with the great current exception of
decolonization." Id. at 465.
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that matters occurring within a state cannot be the concern of in-
ternational law.'
Yet, the traditional view is blind to the fact that many demands
for self-determination have been made and will continue to be
made outside the colonial context. Such claims are, in effect, pleas
to the international community for assistance in achieving either
secession or a restoration of rights. Rules should be fashioned to
regulate the response of the international community where a de-
mand for self-determination amounts to an invitation to other
governments to espouse the cause of a minority party. Although
acceptance of such an invitation would be intervention in a
nation's internal affairs, it may be justified as humanitarian inter-
vention. Competing interests and philosophies exist, however. On
one hand, maintenance of the existing state system may require
rejection of the principles of self-determination and humanitarian
intervention. Conversely, protection of human rights of a minority
may require that the claim and the intervention be regarded as
legitimate. This article presents a framework for balancing these
competing interests.
The prevalence of internal colonialism has been noted in studies
of ethnic problems.' Internal colonialism results where an ethnic
group in control of a government systematically exploits re-
sources of the regions occupied by minority ethnic groups, "reduc-
ing the development of those regions to that of dependencies and
allocating the members of minorities to specific roles in the social
structure on the basis of objective cultural distinctions."5 Typical
results include an inequitable distribution of national wealth and
of access to employment and educational opportunities. With local
resources and income used primarily to serve the interests of the
dominant ethnic or religious group, the resemblance to traditional
colonialism is strong. At times, subservience is maintained by
For a modern reassertion of the principle and a denial that it has been eroded by the
growth of human rights law, see Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the
Development of Human Rights Norms is International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609; Wat-
son, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977).
' For an analysis of these studies, see Smith, Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separation, 2
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 21 (1979).
1 M. HECHTER, INTERNAL COLONIALISM: THE CELTIC FRINGE IN BRITISH NATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT, 1536-1966 (1975); McRoberts, Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec, 2 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 293 (1979). For the use of the concept to explain minority problems within the
United States, see Anders, Internal Colonization of Cherokee Native Americans, 10 DEV. &
CHANGE 41 (1971); Moore, Colonialism: The Case of Mexican Americans, 17 SoC. PROB. 463
(1970); Blauner, Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt, 16 SoC. PROB. 393 (1969).
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violent repression of minorities. Such conditions must concern in-
ternational law, not only because of the violation of human rights
involved but also because of their consequent impact on interna-
tional peace."
The relevance of international law may be justified on several
grounds. First, it would be cynical in light of the present state of
human rights law to argue that because the matter is within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state, it should not concern the interna-
tional community. The concept of sovereignty, which has been
manipulated in the past to disguise violations of human rights, has
developed to the point that international law requires "the protec-
tion of individuals from the dehumanizing acts of their own
governments."7 Second, internal colonialism violates rights which
inhere in groups - rights created by modern developments in in-
ternational law.8 Third, uncontrolled intervention may increase if
rules do not curb inherent temptations. For these reasons, the
problem should be analyzed in light of the law relating to humani-
tarian intervention. If a threat to peace arises in a setting of inter-
nal colonialism, it can best be met by delineating the applicability
of the principles of self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion so clearly that they cannot be abused. In the present interna-
tional context, major world and regional powers avoid direct con-
flict with each other. However, they are not averse to interfering
in ongoing domestic conflicts. Promotion of internal belligerence
in the guise of support of self-determination threatens the terri-
torial integrity of many states. As one commentator observed,
many countries are more correctly termed state-nations rather
than nation-states because they consist of a plurality of ethnic
groups.9 Once conflict occurs, the principle of humanitarian inter-
vention may provide justification for more direct intervention to
secure the rights of minority ethnic groups, thus affording the in-
' For the view that systematic violations of human rights should attract international
concern, see McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968). For the view that international norms on
racial dominance, although formulated largely in the context of South Africa, are not
restricted to that region, see Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human
Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
' Nanda, International Legal Responses to the Destruction of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms in India, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 19, 20 (1976).
' Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
102 (1976).
' Rejai & Enloe, Nation States and State Nations, 13 INT'L STUD. Q. 143 (1969). See also
C. ENLOE, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1973); A. RABUSHKA & K. SHEP-
SLE, POLITICS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1972).
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tervening state a measure of control over the group and the terri-
tory occupied by it. Although this eventuality poses threats, it
does not provide blanket justification for rejecting the principle of
self-determination where minorities are subjected to systematic
deprivations of human rights. In many cases, the denial of the
right would amount to a de facto condonation of violation of rights
of minorities. The principle of humanitarian intervention justifies
the response of interested states to such claims and therein pro-
vides a sanction against the continued violation of rights of minor-
ities. The solution to the problem lies not in the rejection of the
principle of self-determination outside the colonial context, but in
the formulation of limits within which it may operate. Without
rules, the potential for exploitation will continue.10 More worrisome
is that an absence of rules may mean that the norm of the nonuse
of violence will be eroded by expansive use of exceptions to the
norm."
At the outset, this article traces the scope of the principle of
self-determination beyond the context of "salt-water" colonialism.
With this background, the principle of humanitarian intervention
and its validity in a situation of internal colonialism is analyzed.
II. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The argument that humanitarian intervention by outside states
is permissible to assist a minority group subjected to gross viola-
tions of human rights and which, consequently, claims the right to
establish a separate state in the territory it possesses, 2 advances
a principle that strikes at the foundation of the existing world
order based on a system of states. It could be argued that such a
principle attaches primacy to the protection of human rights,
whereas the United Nations system is based on the notion of the
sovereignty of states, noninterference with their internal affairs,
10 In earlier times, interventions in Middle Eastern countries were justified as
humanitarian intervention on behalf of Christians who were being persecuted. Modern
writers regard such justifications as disguises for territorial aggrandizement. See note 59
infta.
" The only accepted exception is self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, but claims to further exceptions have been made on the basis of customary inter-
national law to include anticipatory self-defense (by Israel), intervention at the invitation of
a sovereign (Soviet Union in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan; U.S. in Vietnam), in-
tervention to save the lives of citizens (the U.S. and Belgium in the Congo), and humanitarian
intervention (India in Bangladesh). See parts IV & V inf a.
11 Possession of a well-defined territory by the minority is essential. Where no territory
is possessed, despite racial persecution, a minority cannot claim the right of secession.
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and the nonuse of force in the settlement of disputes. However,
preservation of peace may require that claims to secession be
dealt with by the international community. Hitherto, the tech-
nique for dealing with such situations, as evidenced during the
Biafran and Bangladesh crises, has been to recognize overtly the
sovereignty of the dominant state, to condone the atrocities com-
mitted, and passively to accept covert intervention in the dispute by
interested states. It may be preferable to recognize a right to seces-
sion in certain well-defined circumstances. Thereafter, interven-
tion by an outside state in an ethnic conflict within a state would
be illegal, at least until the objective criteria giving rise to a right
to secession in the minority are satisfied. Additionally, accepted
criteria would provide time to seek an internal settlement of the
conflict. Furthermore, established rules would act as a disincen-
tive to the commission of atrocities against the minority in the
first place.
A recognition of the right to secession in well-defined circum-
stances is realistic. Given the rise of religious and ethnic fervor, a
future source of conflict could arise from claims to secession made
by minority groups and by espousal of these claims by states hav-
ing religious or ethnic ties with the minorities. The traditional
refusal of the international lawyer to deal with these minority
claims is no longer acceptable, given the implications of the prob-
lem for international peace.1 3
A. Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination
Although some deny its validity," "the generally accepted view
today is that the right of self-determination has become, in the
last generation, an integral part of customary international law.""s
In addition to the fact that the principle is referred to in the
", The most recent pronouncement on this topic shows ambivalence: "The position is
therefore that secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral
act the consequences of which are, or may be, regulated internationally." J. CRAWFORD,
supra note 1, at 268. In the Western Sahara case, the International Court of Justice, while
recognizing by implication the principle of self-determination, decided that states should
achieve independence through the decolonization process. [1975] I.C.J. 120 (separate opinion
of Judge Dillard). However, some judges asserted the supremacy of self-determination over
territorial integrity. See iUL at 81 (opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh); id. at 173 (opinion of
Judge Boni). For.comments on the case, see Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 49 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 119 (1978).
" Green, for example, regarded the principle as lege ferenda. Green, supra note 1. See
Rostow. supra note 1, at 272 n.2.
" J. CRAWFORD, supra note 1; Dinstein, supra note 8, at 106.
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Charter of the United Nations 6 and included in a series of declara-
tions and resolutions of the General Assembly, 7 state practice has
resulted in the recognition of self-determination as a principle of
international law. Whether the principle is exhausted once the
process of decolonization ends remains a point of contention.
In view of the fact that the modern principle of self-determina-
tion evolved simultaneously with the rise of nationalism in Asia
and Africa 8 and with the realization in the international commun-
ity that colonialism was anachronistic, it has been argued that
once the decolonization process is completed, the need for the doc-
trine of self-determination ceases. 9 A principle reason supporting
this view is the fear that newly independent countries would
disintegrate into smaller states on the basis of ethnic
composition. 2° The newly independent nations of Africa and Asia
are most susceptible to disintegration if claims to secession on the
basis of ethnicity are permitted. Although they advance the prin-
ciple of self-determination in a series of General Assembly resolu-
tions, these states have been careful to exclude the right of seces-
sion from the principle of self-determination. Paragraph six of the
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (1960), considered the principle-constittenkt document
of the modern principle of self-determinatioi,.statesfthat: "Any at-
tempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the pur-
poses and principles of the charter of the United Nations."2
Spokespersons of newly independent countries consistently deny
the right of secession to ethnic minorities in other international
" U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55.
" In United Nations practice, a declaration is "a formal and solemn instrument," which
"may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding on -states." 34 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (July 1962) 15. (No. 8). A series of subsequent resolutions have endorsed the
principle. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 295, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961); G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 99, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res.
2326, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 244, U.N. Doc. A/L. 541/Rev. and Add. 1 (1967); G.A.
Res. 2908, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 2, U.N. Doc. AIL. 677 and Add. 1 (1972).
R. EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE To NATION (1960).
" See Emerson, supr a note 2. See also R. HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 104. For another
viewpoint, see Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260 (1973).
'* Rostow, Book Review (J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972)), 82 YALE L.J.
829 (1973).
11 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 188, U.N. Doe. N/323 Add. 1-6 (1960). On
the impact of the resolution and its effect on article 2(7) of the Charter, see Emerson, The
United Nations and Colonialism, in THE EVOLVING UNITED NATIONS: A PROSPECT FOR PEACE
83 (K. Twitchett ed. 1971). See also Emerson, Colonialism, Political Development and the
United Nations, 19 INT'L ORG. 484 (1965).
[Vol. 11:1
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
forums.' A former Secretary General of the United Nations
stated: "The United Nations has never accepted and does not ac-
cept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of seces-
sion of a part of its member state."23 The attitude of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity toward the Biafran secession indicated that
its members did not favor the right of secession of a minority com-
munity.24 Although repression of minority groups and claims to
secession are not limited to developing countries, the concept of
self-determination as a protective device has particular relevance
to the states of Africa and Asia, which were divided into states by
colonial powers without regard to the ethnic composition of the
states created.25
Although claims to secession may induce a state to remedy op-
pression to forestall international scrutiny, when a minority group
unsuccessfully asserts municipal law, appeal to the international
community may be the sole alternative to war. Indeed, in situa-
tions where the minority has a territorial base and sufficient
power, it may openly assert the right of secession.2" In view of the
fact that, unlike the League of Nations system, the United Na-
tions has not provided adequate machinery for the redress of
minority grievances,27 recognition of a limited right of secession
would be a potent mechanism by which the claims of a minority
may be assessed by the international community.
'2 For a survey, see V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 87 (1970).
' Press conference with U Thant, former Secretary General of the United Nations, 7
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 34, 36 (1960).
2 Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 321 (1975). Article 111 (3) of the Charter of the O.A.U. affirms the principle of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state. The O.A.U. Resolution of July 1964
declared that "all Member States pledge themselves to respect frontiers existing on their
achievement of national independence." Art. 16 (1). However, several states entered reser-
vations. The Somalis, who claimed that Greater Somalia includes areas of Kenyan and
Ethiopian territory occupied by the Somali tribesmen, did not accept the resolution. See L.
BUCHHEIT, supra note 1, at 178-89. Both Algeria and Morocco, which were involved in the
Western Sahara dispute, entered reservations. See R. ANDEMICAEL, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
AMONG AFRICAN STATES 11 (Unitar PS No. 5, 1972).
' C. ENLOE, supra note 9; A. RABUSHKA & K. SHEPSLE, supra note 9; H. TINKER, RACE,
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1977).
" For example, the following groups openly asserted such rights: the French in Quebec;
the Basques in Spain; the Scots in the United Kingdom; the Nagas in India; the Tamils of
Sri Lanka; the Kachins of Burma; and the Muslims of the Philippines.
' See Bruegel, A Neglected Field& The Protection of Minorities, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 413
(1971).
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B. Self-Determination and the Right to Secession
Unlike the League system, which placed considerable emphasis
upon the protection of minorities,' the United Nations Charter
stresses the protection of individual human rights. The difference
may have resulted from the misconception, at least in Europe,
that minority problems had been solved, or, perhaps, that protec-
tion of individual rights would ensure the protection of rights of
minority groups. In any event, the later practice of international
organizations associated with human rights placed greater em-
phasis upon racial discrimination than upon protection of rights of
minorities.' An early observer of this trend, Sir Hersch Lauter-
pacht, commented: "It was a sign of political and moral retrogres-
sion in international relations after the Second World War that
the aspect of protection of minorities received less attention than
after the termination of the First World War."' In the thirty
years that have elapsed since this observation, no change is dis-
cernible in the policy of the United Nations.
In the absence of a system of minority protection in the United
Nations, the principle of self-determination, which has been devel-
oped in an ad hoc fashion at the United Nations, provides some
protection to rights of minorities.31 The aim of nations that con-
tributed to the creation of the norm was to end the dominance of
one group by another. Efforts to limit the principle to "salt-water"
colonialism seem artificial when the broad objective of the princi-
ple is to end the dominance of one group by another. 32 That this
was the objective behind the formulation of the principle by the
United Nations appears from General Assembly resolutions in the
field of racial discrimination and apartheid. To derive a system of
minority protection from the various declarations and resolutions
in the general area of race relations, the issues of self-determina-
tion and racial discrimination must be addressed.
Id. at 425.
"Id. at 428; Dinstein, supra note 8; Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. (1968).
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 353 (1950).
32 Thus, Yoram Dinstein observed:
In the world of reality, however, there is scarely a state today (even in Europe)
which is free of minorities and their problems. In many places these problems
have become only more acute in recent years. It is clear that the exclusive pursuit
of individual human rights, without paying heed to the collective needs of
minorities, is a counter-productive policy.
Dinstein, supra note 8, at 117.
' A. MAZRUI, TOWARDS A PAX AFRICANA 14-16 (1967).
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The norm of nondiscrimination on ethnic or religious grounds is
a principle of modern international law. The United Nations docu-
ment most related to racial discrimination is the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (1965).' The Convention reflects the ideas on equal rights of
minorities recognized by municipal legal systems." Quite indepen-
dent of the Convention, Judge Tanaka, in the South West Africa
Case, concluded that "the norm of nondiscrimination or
nonseparation on the basis of race has become a rule of customary
international law."' Because racial discrimination is based upon
group membership, it could be argued that the goal is not only the
protection of the individual against discrimination but also protec-
tion of the group of which he or she is a member.
Viewed in the context of preventing racial discrimination, self-
determination has relevance as a sanctioning right, which
emerges if the primary right of nondiscrimination is violated by a
state." In this light, self-determination is consistent with the
theory of the unitary state, which permits groups within the state
to opt out if the state no longer satisfies its obligation of confer-
ring protection. This proposition is not based on an effort to con-
struct a theoretical base. It exists in practice, as evidenced by
United Nations documents which state that the right of self-deter-
mination is a right of "all peoples" and not only of people in non-
self-governing territories. That such an expansive right would be
used to support the claims of minorities to secession was a
possibility considered and discussed prior to passage of the resolu-
tions. 7 The British view, both official and academic, favored a
broad construction, an attitude reflecting the consensus." Indeed,
33 G.A. Res. 2106a, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in
15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1059 (1966). According to one commentator this document
"represents the most comprehensive codification in treaty form of the equality of races."
Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 15 INT'L. & CoMp. L.Q. 996, 1057 (1966). See also N. LERNER, THE U.N. CON-
VENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1970).
' McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law, 44 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 177 (1970).
[1966] I.C.J. 284. The judgment of Judge Tanaka, according to Professor Brownlie,
"contains what is probably the best exposition of the concept of equality in existing
literature." I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 455 (1971). But for criticisms
of its use in human rights literature, see Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the
Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609.
" Fawcett, The Role of the United Nations in the Protection of Human Rights-Is It
Misconceived?, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Eide & A. Schou eds.
1968).
3, L. BUCHHEIT, supra note 1, at 75-76; Dinstein, supra note 8, at 108,
u J. GUTTERIGE, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 51-56 (1969).
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the resolutions were adopted with the knowledge that self-
determination has meaning beyond the colonial context.
However, it appears from practice that claims to secession on
the basis of self-determination are carefully circumscribed. This is
apparent from a comparison of article six of the 1960 Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples" with paragraph seven of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations.'0 The former contains a prohibition of "any attempt
aimed at the total or partial disruption of the national unity and
territorial integrity of a country."'1 Paragraph seven of the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations reads as follows:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign independent states conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.'2
The 1970 Declaration recognizes a connection between equal pro-
tection of laws and the principle of self-determination in that it en-
sures the preservation of the territorial integrity of a state by
rendering a state immune to the exercise of self-determination
only if that state has protected the rights of all its people. This
strong linkage between an obligation to protect human rights and
the principle of self-determination in a document accepted as an
interpretation of Charter principles supports the thesis that it is a
sanction against the nonobservance of human rights.
Although future problems will arise if the right is asserted by
" G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 21.
40 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
,1 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 21.
, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 40. The declaration proclaimed seven principles as
being in accordance with the Charter, one of which was the right of self-determination of
peoples. On the resolution, see Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971); Arangio-Ruiz,
The Normative Role of the General Assembly of The United Nations and the Declaration
of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law) 421 (111-1972).
"s This view is supported by Rosenstock, supra note 42, at 715. See also L. BUCHHEIT,
supra note 1, at 94; Note, Towards Self-Determination - A Reappraisal as Reflected in
the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145 (1973). However,
Arangio-Ruiz states that "the whole part of the declaration concerning self-determination
must be understood as a de lege ferenda formulation." Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 42, at 571.
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violence," in the context of apartheid, a violent assertion of the
right of self-determination has not been frowned upon. In practice,
the Security Council has regarded apartheid as a threat to inter-
national peace.'5 The resolutions of the General Assembly not only
condone the use of violence against apartheid but also advocate
the disbursement of aid to struggles against it. However, it would
be short-sighted to limit application of self-determination to situa-
tions of racial inequity or suppression of the minority by the ma-
jority.'6 The South African system would be equally repugnant if
it involved no racial overtones or suppression of the majority by
the minority. The essential factor is the abuse of power by the
dominant, controlling group, not race or numbers. If the use of
violence to abolish apartheid in South Africa can be condoned by
the international community, it perhaps is not too attenuated to
suggest that violence against similar practices is legitimate.
Without assistance from somewhere, violence will continue to
escalate." However, because abuse of the principle is possible, it is
imperative that justification for intervention be limited.
A right to secession can arise only where internal remedies
have failed. By this time, a state or international organization may
have been approached or may have sought to intervene to settle
the problem amicably. However, the power is initially with the
state to avoid international concern.'" As violence increases,
foreign intervention is more likely. Refugee problems, religious or
ethnic affinities," the economic effects of the internal war upon
" Buchheit states that preference must be given to a right asserted in a nonviolent
fashion. L. BUCHHEIT, supra note 1. This would be illogical. The method of assertion of the
right depends on several factors, such as the absence of violent methods of repression of
minority rights, and the existence of constitutional and other means of seeking redress.
" S.C. Res. 417, 418 U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977); Johnson, Sanctions and South Africa, 19
HARV. J. INT'L L. 887 (1978).
" See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 96, U.N. Doc. N/9412 (1973), on
the Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against Colonial and
Alien Domination. For a discussion of self-determination in the South African context, see
Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Bantustan
Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 190-95 (1978).
47 Krippendorf, Minorities, Violence, and Peace, 16 J. PEACE RESEARCH 27 (1979) (author
argues that unless socioeconomic inequalities and discrimination are eradicated, resort by
minority groups to terrorism and violence is unavoidable). See also H. LAUTERPACHT, supra
note 30, at 352.
48 Consider, for example, efforts to settle the problem created by Basque claims to seces-
sion by assuring them greater regional autonomy.
49 The interest of Islamic states in the rebellion of the Muslims in Mindanao against the
Philippines would be one example. At one stage, the Philippine government sought to
negotiate a settlement through Libya. In the context of decolonization, a resolution was
passed at a seminar of Indian teachers of international law that a colonial people have an in-
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neighboring states, and the potential for a shift in the balance of
power created by alteration of the status quo are variables that in-
vite foreign intervention. Before unilateral intervention occurs it
would be ideal if the international community imposed a solution
by either creating a separate state or by promulgating and imple-
menting constitutional protection of the minority within the exist-
ing state. Unfortunately, such a scenario is unlikely. On rare occa-
sions, outside states may act in like fashion either in consultation
with each other or individually to influence the outcome of the dis-
pute.' However, in a majority of instances, states with varying in-
terests would intervene to settle the outcome of the dispute. In
these circumstances, the need for rules is clear. Fortunately, the
existing doctrine of humanitarian intervention has safeguards
against abuse.
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Classical international law permitted intervention to protect
the interests of minority groups subjected to violation of human
rights by recognizing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.51
The doctrine was accepted despite positivist notions of state
sovereignty. Simply stated, certain principles of humanity trans-
cend the idea of sovereignty. When violations of these principles
occur, immunity from intervention provided by the doctrine of
sovereignty offers no protection. Indeed, where humanitarian in-
tervention is justified, the right of the entrenched government to
summon assistance from outside parties should be suspended.
A. Historical Evolution
Humanitarian intervention, like self-determination, is a princi-
ple of natural law ideology that survives despite widespread ac-
ceptance of concepts of sovereignty and of noninterference in
domestic affairs. The survival of the doctrine is facilitated both by
the fact that ethnic and minority groups are separated by national
boundaries and because sympathetic neighboring states exhibit
herent right "to seek external assistance to attain independence ..... " Jain, Seminar on
the Role of the United Nations in the Development of International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
582, 582 (1971).
" An example of such an unlikely situation (not in the context of self-determination) was
the insurrection of 1972 in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) when the United States, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, and China gave assistance to the government.
11 P. REMEC, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO
GROTIUS AND VATTEL 232 (1960).
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concern for minority well-being.52 In circumstances of violent
repression, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has long
been acceptable, even in the heyday of positivist views.'
Instances of intervention during the nineteenth century sup-
port the concept of humanitarian intervention." These incidents
have been well-documented. 5 Reisman and McDougal,M and
others, 7 consider these early cases to be clear recognition of the
principle of humanitarian intervention. GangP8 and Brownlie, s9
however, explain nineteenth century intervention on the basis of
treaty provisions, which permitted Christian states to intervene
in the states of the Ottoman Empire to protect Christian minori-
ties from atrocities. The dispute is one on which jurists seem
equally divided.' Nonetheless, examination of state practice in the
nineteenth century interventions indicates that, despite the ex-
istence of treaty rights of intervention, states claimed the right of
intervention on humanitarian grounds, attaching primacy to that
principle over their treaty rights as the justification for the inter-
vention."1 In view of such practice, whatever the true motives for
Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84
YALE L.J. 969 (1975).
" P. REMEC, supra note 51, at 232.
See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (8th ed. 1956).
For a comprehensive analysis of these instances, see M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTEC.
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1962). The majority of the nineteenth-century incidents concerned
Turkish atrocities against Christians (Greece, 1830; Syria, 1860; Crete, 1866; Bosnia and
Bulgaria, 1878).
" Reisman & McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 179-83 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
"7 See, e.g., Chilstrom, Humanitarian Intervention Under Contemporary International
Law: A Policy-Oriented Approach, 1 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 93 (1974); Fonteyne,
Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity
Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974). See also Behuniak, The Law of
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV.
157 (1978); Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV.
325, 333 (1967).
58 M. GANJI, supra note 55, at 43. Ganji, however, agrees that although humanitarian in-
tervention is not a doctrine of customary international law, "an intervention to put a stop to
barbarous and abominable cruelty is a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of
law." Id. However, Ganji believed that, because international organization is now under the
aegis of the United Nations, only an intervention sanctioned by the United Nations could be
considered legitimate.
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 342 (1963). See also
Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217,
220-21 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
" For a list, see M. GANJI, supra note 55, at 41.
" For example, in the treaty following the Greek intervention of 1829, the major powers
indicated that their actions were motivated "no less by sentiments of humanity, than by in-
terest for the tranquility of Europe." BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 633 (1829).
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the intervention may have been, it should be understood that the
practice of the European nations of the nineteenth century indi-
cates recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention as a
rule of customary international law.
B. U.N. Practice
Once it is accepted that the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion forms a part of customary international law, the remaining
question is whether the doctrine survives the provisions of the
Charter prohibiting resort to the use of force (article 2(4)) except
in self-defense (article 51) or under the authority of the Security
Council (articles 42 and 43). Two views on this issue warrant ex-
amination.
The strict constructionist view is that article 2(4) contains an ab-
solute prohibition against resort to armed force, except in the cir-
cumstances mentioned in article 51 and in situations where the
Security Council takes enforcement action in accordance with the
procedure outlined in chapter VIII of the Charter. Writing im-
mediately after the Charter was drafted, Judge Jessup adopted
this view.2 If the Charter system, as envisaged by the Founders,
had been put into effect, with a Security Council equipped to
maintain international peace, there would have been merit in this
interpretation. However, the failure of the United Nations to func-
tion in the contemplated manner has left states without an effec-
tive system of protection. Given this context, it is unrealistic to
expect states to abide by the norm of abstention from force, par-
ticularly in situations where self-preservation is threatened or
where the customary international law prior to the Charter per-
mitted the use of force. It would accord with international expec-
tations to formulate a rule that details exceptional situations in
which principles of customary international law may be employed
to justify the use of force." The practice of states shows that this
is the accepted norm.
The desire that the prohibition of the use of force not be eroded
by exceptions other than those in the Charter has prompted a
strict view of the prohibition of force in article 2(4)." However,
" P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1948).
" The most recent example is the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania to overthrow the
regime of Idi Amin. Legality was hardly questioned in the international fora since that in-
tervention ended a universally condemned regime. See part V infra
" Among them are Falk, Conference Proceedings, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 33 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Rostow, supra note 1. But see I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 59, at 298; Falk, supra, at 69.
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there is general reluctance to maintain an absolute prohibition of
the use of force due to the ineffectiveness of the United Nations
system. Jessup recognized the possibility of permitting humani-
tarian intervention under the Charter in the exceptional instance
where the Security Council is unable to act with sufficient speed.,,
Likewise, Rostow accepts the validity of humanitarian interven-
tion by straining the principle of self-defense stated in article 51
to encompass it." Others, who in the past supported a strict inter-
pretation of article 2(4), have displayed uneasiness in holding to
that view in light of the inability of the United Nations to deal
with such situations as Biafra and Bangladesh. 7 McDougal, who
formerly supported the strict view, has recently adopted a stance
more amenable to humanitarian intervention."
The strict view proceeds from a loyalty to the Charter system
and the belief that any erosion of the norm against the use of force
on the basis of the customary law that existed prior to the
Charter would undermine the system. But the failure of the
Charter system is a fact. States have intervened militarily in in-
ternal problems and justified their intervention on such bases of
customary law as the invitation of the legitimate government,69
the protection of nationals,"0 and the protection of human rights of
minority groups." Future efforts must be directed toward limiting
these doctrines rather than clinging to the myth of the prohibition
P. JESSUP, supra note 62.
' Rostow states: "The customary international law right of humanitarian intervention in
situations of chaos and massacre survives under the Charter, presumably as a form of limited
self-help under Article 51 to remedy catastrophic breaches of international law.
Rostow, Book Review, 82 YALE L. REV. 829, 848 (1972).
67 See, e.g., Friedman, General Course in Public International Law, 127 RECUEIL DES
COURS (Hague Academy of International Law) 200-14 (11-1969).
0 McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 19, 28
(1967):
I'm ashamed to confess that at one time I lent my support to the suggestions that
Article 2(4) and the related articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-
defense. On reflection, I think that this was a very grave mistake, that Article
2(4) and Article 51 must be interpreted differently.
Examples include the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965) and
in Vietnam; the Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956), in Czechoslovakia (1968), and in
Afghanistan (1979); the French intervention in Zaire (1978) and in Chad and Western
Sahara (1978). For commentary on these recent French interventions, see Hollick, French
Intervention in Africa, 1978, 35 WORLD TODAY 71 (1979).
70 Consider, for example, the American intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965) and
the French intervention in Shaba, Zaire (1978).
71 Examples of protection of human rights include the Indian intervention in Bangladesh
(1972), the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea (1978), and the Tanzanian intervention in
Uganda (1978).
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of the use of force by the Charter. The United Nations has been
inactive in the face of these interventions."2 Recognizing the
breakdown of the system under the Charter, the best approach is
to formulate customary rules of international law in a manner
least inconsistent with Charter norms.
The second view on article 2(4) is that, although the nonuse of
force in international relations is a principle of modern interna-
tional law, in the absence of an effective Security Council, it is
necessary to retain certain rules of customary international law
relating to self-help. In addition to the fact that recent events
have undermined the strength of the Charter prohibition on the
use of force, there are other reasons for rejecting the strict con-
structionist approach.73 First, the strict constructionist approach
to article 2(4) denies parity to other norms in the Charter. Although
the preservation of human rights is an aim of the Charter,7' in pur-
suance of which the organs of the United Nations have built an im-
pressive jurisprudence,5 absolute prohibition of the use of force,
except in self-defense or if a threat to peace is found under article
39, would amount to a denial of human rights. Because the Secur-
ity Council, in the context of Great Power rivalries, may not act,
the international community may be compelled to witness atroci-
ties. Jessup, who was among the first to insist upon a strict view
of article 2(4), eventually recognized the continuing scope humani-
tarian intervention may have under the Charter system when he
said: "It would seem that the only possible argument against the
substitution of collective measures under the Security Council for
individual measures by a single state would be the inability of the
international organization to act with speed requisite to preserve
life."7 Because recent events show the inability of the United Na-
" On the United Nations response to some recent interventions, see K. MISRA, THE ROLE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT (1973). Misra's work highlights the
irrelevance of the Security Council during the incident. The view is supported by Salzberg,
U.N. Prevention of Human Rights Violations: The Bangladesh Case, 27 INT'L ORG. 115
(1973).
7 Franck pronounced the demise of article 2(4) a decade ago. Franck, Who Killed Article
2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809
(1970). For a reply, see Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exag-
gerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
", Articles 55 and 56 clearly relate to human rights. The notion that the human rights
provisions are not binding and have a subsidiary role to the norm of nonuse of force may be
attributed to the influence of the views of Hans Kelsen. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1950).
" See generally I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971). For doubts as
to the strength of human rights norms, see Watson, supra note 35.
76 P. JESSUP, supra note 62, at 170. See also R. HIGGINS, supra note 2.
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tions to act speedily or otherwise,77 protection of human rights
conflicts with a strict approach.
A second reason for avoiding a strict view is that the commun-
ity of nations should be presumed to have agreed that previously-
established means of protecting human rights survive. Article 7 of
the General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggres-
sion" has significance in this respect. Stated as an exception to
the articles that prohibit resort to the use of force, article 7 in-
dicates the acceptance on the part of states that once a minority's
right to self-determination matures, it has the right to struggle
against domination, as well as the right to receive support from
other states in that struggle.
A third reason for rejecting a strict interpretation of article 2(4)
is the movement in humanitarian law that confers protection on
those involved in civil wars; a movement which suggests a grow-
ing recognition in international law of the rights of nongovern-
mental entities engaged in an armed struggle against the govern-
ment.79 The progressive assimilation of wars fought against col-
onial regimes with international armed conflicts for purposes of
the application of the Geneva Conventions may be seen in resolu-
tions of the General Assembly calling for the treatment of cap-
tured "freedom fighters" as prisoners of war. 0 These resolutions
strengthen arguments that seek to confer protection upon the
77 Henkin pointed out that the most appealing remedy, multilateral intervention under
the aegis of the Security Council, was not politically feasible. Henkin, Biafra, Bengal and
Beyond:i International Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict, 66 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
96 (1972).
78 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). On prob-
lems relating to article seven of the Resolution, see Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974
Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224, 235-37 (1977).
" This movement has bridged the gap between the laws of war and the law of human
rights. De Stoop, New Guarantees for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts - A Major
Result of the Geneva Conference 1974-1977, 6 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 52 (1978); Draper,
Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 326 (1972); Draper, Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights, ACTA JURIDICA 193 (1979). The link between human rights law and
humanitarian law was foreshadowed in an early paper. See Dunbar, The Legal Regulation
of Modern Warfare, 40 GROTIUS Socy TRANS. 83 (1955).
' G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 40. For the view that a political entity denied self-
determination should be regarded as an international entity, see Abi-Saab, Wars of Na-
tional Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 ANNALES D'ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 93 (1972).
For a criticism of the view, see Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics, 16
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1975); Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars of National
Liberation, 57 REVISTA DI DIRRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 193 (1974). For the view that Biafra, an
entity created by a claim to secession by an ethnic group, had status to be protected by the
customary laws of war, see Nwogugu, The Nigerian Civil War: A Case Study in the Law of
War, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 13, 19 (1974).
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nongovernmental party in civil wars and to lend support to the
argument that any "people" having claims to territory by virtue
of their historical and cultural ties to that territory should be
treated as having international personality.8" Because the Second
Protocol confers protection, it is reasonable to argue that it also
recognizes and attributes at least a limited personality to the
nongovernmental party."2 Indeed, in recent years, outside states
have often recognized the insurgents as a new government or as a
new state."3
A final reason to reject a narrow interpretation of article 2(4)
relates to problems of vagueness. If varied notions of self-help
continue to survive although not articulated with any measure of
precision, claims to legitimacy of such action would be made on
esoteric grounds, weakening the norm of the nonuse of force con-
siderably more than if rules of self-help based on customary inter-
national law are recognized.'
It is possible to recognize expansive claims. One such claim is
that where hostilities have reached the extent that the legitimate
government has lost all control over events, intervention to re-
store order is permissible and is not a violation of article 2(4). Sup-
posedly, no claims of violation of territorial integrity or political
independence would be viable, as events occurring before the in-
tervention would have made both factors nonexistent. 5 The weak-
" The recognition of the P.L.O. by several governments, including Austria and India,
gives impetus to this view. Before the advent of colonialism, which divided Africa and Asia
into states, the African and Asian "states" that existed were organized largely on ethnic
lines and had personality, at least according to the natural lawyers. Alexandrowicz, Em-
pirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 286 (1975). It
could be argued that this personality is revived in an ethnic minority (which was a state
prior to colonialism), if its right to secession had matured as a result of denial of equality.
During the Algerian civil war, the application of the Fronte de Liberation Nationale
(F.L.N.) that the captured freedom fighters should be treated as prisoners of war was refused
on the ground that the F.L.N. did not have a status to enjoy the protection of the Red Cross
Conventions against a state that did not recognize it. The Swiss Federal Council declared the
Algerian accession to the 1949 Conventions as "without juridical relevance" against France.
See Greenberg, Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 65
(1970). See also M. BEDJAOUI. LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 207-20 (1961).
"a J. CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 268-69. Crawford refers to the Spanish civil war, Biafra,
Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Indonesia. The recognition of the Palestine Liberation
Organization as a government strengthens the argument that a minority group in posses-
sion of territory may be regarded as the government of a state.
" Chilstrom, Humanitarian Intervention Under Contemporary International Law: A
Policy-Oriented Approach, 1 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 93 (1974).
' Other instances of such claims would be the assertion that a people without a ter-
ritorial base have a right to create a state in territory formerly occupied by them, as their
eviction amounted to an armed attack. The claim is one upon which the foundations of
Israel is based. Another instance would be a claim that the people constituted a sovereign
entity prior to conquest or annexation into the state.
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ness of this claim is that it would lead to a negation of any control
over the intervention by law because any intervening state could
seek to restore order by assisting the party it favors. Another ex-
pansive claim, equally imperfect, is to justify the intervention on
grounds of self-defense, arguing that protection of national inter-
ests may justify the intervention. Such justifications would have a
deleterious effect on the norm of avoidance of force. A better ap-
proach is to recognize the customary principles permitting inter-
vention, and to control them in a manner consistent with Charter
objectives.
The consistency of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
with Charter principles should be conceded. If the protection of
human rights is regarded as essential to peace, the best means to
protect it, in view of the fact that the Security Council may not
act, is through individual or collective intervention of states on
behalf of the oppressed minority. One may be justified in conclud-
ing that Charter principles and the practice of states since adop-
tion of the Charter are consistent with the principle expressed by
Lord Shawcross, who said that "the rights of humanitarian inter-
vention on behalf of the rights of man trampled upon by a state in
a manner shocking to the sense of mankind has long been con-
sidered to form part of the recognized law of nations.""
IV. CONDITIONS IN WHICH HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION MAY BE EXERCISED
Having argued that the principle of humanitarian intervention
survives the Charter and has relevance in the contemporary
world as a means of protecting oppressed minorities, other mat-
ters should be addressed. Among major concerns are the criticism
that abuse may lead to greater confrontation among interested
powers, that the creation of client-entities may ensue, and that a
precedent for similar intervention in the future may be set. The
possibility of abuse and consequent adverse effects upon interna-
tional order render attractive the view of the adherents of an ab-
solute prohibition of the use of force by states except in self-
defense."
Because of the nuclear stalemate between the Big Powers,
proxy wars and interventions have become the means to enhance
influence, particularly in newly-independent states of Africa and
Quoted in A.J. THOMAS & A. THOMAS. NON-INTERVENTION 374 (1956).
'7 Henkin rejected the doctrine on the ground that it can be easily fabricated. Henkin,
supra note 77.
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Asia." The doctrine of humanitarian intervention could be used to
confer legitimacy upon an intervention initiated merely to achieve
or maintain supremacy in a region. Recent history is replete with
instances of intervention that were justified on lofty idealistic
grounds, but which were, in reality, embarked upon in pursuit of
national interests." An example is the fraudulent assertion of self-
determination for Sudetenland, which sparked the Second World
War." Nonetheless, Judge Tanaka said, "the denial of human
rights can create a serious threat to peace and the trouble that
may be engendered by intervention would be less serious in
general than that which might be caused by abstaining from inter-
vention."'91 A brief examination of interventions justified on
humanitarian grounds since the signing of the Charter is war-
ranted.
A. The Congo Crisis (1964)
The United States and Belgium were involved in a military ac-
tion to rescue European, American, and other nationals held hos-
tage by a rebel group during the Congo Crisis." There was evi-
dence that some of the hostages had been executed and the fear
existed that others would suffer a similar fate." In announcing the
operation, the United States Department of State observed:
This operation is humanitarian -not military. It is designed to
avoid bloodshed-not to engage the rebel forces in combat. Its
purpose is to accomplish its task quickly and withdraw-not to
seize or hold territory. Personnel engaged are under orders to
use force only in their own defense or in the defense of foreign
and Congolese civilians. They will depart from the scene as soon
as their evacuation mission is accomplished.9'
Reviewing the circumstances of the intervention, Lillich reached
the "inescapable conclusion that if ever there was a case for the
use of forcible self-help to protect lives, the Congo rescue opera-
" R. FALK. LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (1968); J. ROSENAU, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
OF CIVIL STRIFE 6 (1964).
" Barnet, Patterns of Intervention, in II THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1164 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
" A. J. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 86, at 374.
" Tanaka, Some Observations on Peace, Law and Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL
LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 242, 255 (W. Friedmann, L. Henkin, & 0. Lissitzyn eds. 1972).
" For the factual background of the crisis, see Lemarchand, The Limits of Self-
Determination. The Case of the Katanga Secession, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404 (1962).
13 51 DEPT STATE BULL. 840 (1964); 52 DEPT STATE BULL. 18 (1964).
" 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 842 (1964), cited in Lillich, supra note 57, at 340.
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tion was it.""5 Similar views have been expressed by others.N
Frey-Wouters, however, has suggested that the operation, under-
taken at an opportune moment, was not entirely selfless, as it
facilitated the crushing of the rebel faction.97 However, it is un-
wise to condemn the Congo operation on the ground that its moti-
vation was not altruistic. A total lack of altruism on the part of
the intervening state should not be a reason for condemnation if
circumstances justifying humanitarian intervention are present.
The primary justification advanced for the Stanleyville opera-
tion emphasized the principle of humanitarian intervention.98
However, there is some contention as to the applicability of the
doctrine.99 Brownlie suggested that the legality of the intervention
was not based on the principle of humanitarian intervention but
on the fact that the operation took place "with the authorization of
the Government of Congo."'100 If a customary principle of interna-
tional law that intervention is permissible if requested or author-
ized by the legitimate government survives the Charter, there is
little reason humanitarian intervention, which is also a principle of
customary international law, cannot be regarded as having sur-
vived the Charter.'' The customary rule legitimizing intervention
based on the request of a government is open to as much abuse as
the principle of humanitarian intervention. For example, to
legitimize an intervention, as the Big Powers have demonstrated,
all that is necessary is to set up a puppet government and to ex-
tract an invitation to intervene. Brownlie's confident characteriza-
tion of the Tshombe government as the "Government of Congo"
demonstrates the difficulties that attend upon the justification."°2
" See also Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULA-
TION OF CIVIL WARS 169, 176 (E. Luard ed. 1972).
See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 56, at-186.
' HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, Conference Proceedings at
58 n.5 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). See also Higgins, supra note 95.
" A criticism of the African states was that humanitarianism, on this occasion, had racial
overtones in that an operation was mounted to save a few Europeans, while many Africans
were being massacred. From this criticism proceeds the further criticism that the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention provided a pretext for aiding a pro-Western faction. For an
analysis of these criticisms, see Weisberg, The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in
Humanitarian Intervention, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1972).
" For the status of the rule in modern international law, see Leurdijk, Civil War and In-
tervention in International Law 24 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 143 (1977).
"' Brownlie, supra note 59, at 220-21.
101 Brownlie denied that humanitarian intervention is a principle of customary interna-
tional law. Id. However, in older texts, that principle is stated with as much weight as the
principle of the legitimacy of intervention at the request of the legitimate government.
30 The Tshombe government was not recognized by many states and did not possess suf-
ficient control at the time of the invitation to be characterized as the "Government of Con-
go." On the insignificance of the Tshombe government's invitation to intervene in making
the decision to intervene, see Weisberg, supra note 98, at 271.
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Franck and Rodley, who also oppose the doctrine, seek to explain
the legality of the intervention in the Congo by resorting to the
doctrine, based on customary law,"3 that intervention to protect
diplomatic personnel is permissible.'
The failure on the part of the Security Council to condemn the
intervention could arguably be interpreted as implied approval of
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention on this occasion."5
The intervention in the Congo crisis provides strong precedent
for the argument that the principle of humanitarian intervention
survives the Charter. From the point of view of fashioning norms
limiting the abuse of humanitarian intervention, the importance of
the Congo operation lies in the fact that it had a limited objective
and was terminated upon achievement of that objective. In addi-
tion, peaceful means of securing the release of hostages were ex-
hausted, perhaps setting precedent for the limiting rule that
humanitarian intervention be preceded by efforts to remedy the
alleged violation of human rights in a peaceful manner."
B. The Dominican Republic Crisis (1965)
After the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship, which lasted more
than three decades in the Dominican Republic, political and mili-
tary factions vied for power.0 7 When left wing groups emerged as
leading contenders for power and as clashes between the factions
developed, the United States landed 500 marines for the ostensi-
ble purpose of protecting American lives. The presence of Ameri-
can military personnel steadily increased.
Justifications advanced for the intervention were based on
humanitarian grounds. Ambassador Bunker stated that "[tihe
United States forces were dispatched purely and solely for
Authority can be found in A. J. THOMAS & A. THOMAS. supra note 86.
Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
'" De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.
J. 21, 23 (1972).
' The United States delegate observed in the Security Council debate that "every
means-legal, moral and humane, including the United Nations-was exhausted to protect
their lives and secure their release, and all without avail." 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) 12
(1964).
" The circumstances surrounding the crisis are detailed in the following works: A.
LOWENTHAL, THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION (1972); A.J. THOMAS & A. THOMAS. THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS (J. Carey ed. 1967). See also Meeker, The Dominican Situation
in the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEPT STATE BULL. 60 (1965); Nanda, The United
States'Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order - Part I, 43 DEN. L.J.
439 (1966).
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humanitarian purposes, for the protection of lives not only of the
United States citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries
as well."108 Similar statements were made by President Johnson
and other administration officials." 9 Doubts have been expressed
as to the validity of this justification.10 Although the initial lan-
ding of 500 marines may be defended on this ground, the claim
that humanitarian intervention is applicable to the entire opera-
tion is weak,"' despite the limited success of efforts to set up a
democratic government and the approval of the intervention by
the Organization of American States."' The value of the
Dominican Crisis to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention lies
not only in providing an illustration of an abuse of the doctrine
but also in the fact that a Great Power considered the doctrine
sufficiently viable to excuse its intervention. A lesson to be drawn
from the incident is that a prolonged operation, as opposed to a
surgical strike, stands a lesser chance of being justified on the
basis of humanitarian intervention.
C. The Bangladesh Crisis (1971)
The Bangladesh crisis and the intervention that ensued led to a
successful assertion of the right to self-determination by the
Bengali people and to the creation of an independent state."3 The
human agony involved in the crisis caused some adherents of the
strict view of article 2(4) to soften their position and to rationalize
the Indian intervention as consistent with their position."
101 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 854 (1965).
,o Id at 742.
Il A. LOWENTHAL, supra note 107, at 104.
A State Department adviser admitted as much. See Conference Proceedings, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 80-81 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) (remarks
of Mr. Almondin).
1' Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-Defense, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64 (1966). These justifications are rejected by Bogen, supra note 107. See also
Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 1147 (1967).
"' For a survey of literature on the crisis, see Nair, Survey of Source Material on
Bangladesh, 13 INT'L STUD. 324 (1974). The legal issues are analyzed in S. CHOWDHURY. THE
GENESIS OF BANGLADESH (1972); S. MUKHERJEE, BANGLADESH AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971);
Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1972), Nawaz,
Bangla Desh and International Law, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 459 (1971); Mani, The 1971 War on
the Indian Sub-Continent and International Law, 12 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 83 (1972); Franck &
Rodley, supra note 104; Joyner, The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War in Retrospect, 7 EASTERN J.
INT'L L. 18 (1975).
.14 Thus, Friedman, for example, who supported a strict view of article 2(4), said in
reference to the Indian intervention that "what was in formal terms an illegal action was
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West Pakistan was physically separated from East Pakistan by
a thousand miles of Indian territory. The people of the two wings
were ethnically different; the only point of unity was the Islamic
religion. The fact that the official language was Urdu and not
Bengali, the fact that administration was centered in Lahore in
West Pakistan, and the fact that wealth generated in the Eastern
wing supported higher living standards in the West contributed
to the resentment on the part of Bengalis. In response, the Awami
League, a major political force, claimed secession from the West.
Because the army was dominated by officers from the Western
wing, which did not approve of the turn of events, the leader of
the Awami League was arrested and charged with treason. The
arrest led to widespread rioting and eventually the military
government sent in troops. The soldiers, again drawn largely from
the West, began a course of ruthless suppression, driving more
than ten million refugees across the border into India."5 As a
result of the burden refugees cast upon India and the guerrilla ac-
tivity from Indian territory against Pakistani troops, considerable
tension developed between India and Pakistan. Difficulties con-
tinued to exist throughout the efforts to suppress the Bengali
revolt. In December 1971, Pakistani aircraft bombed an airfield in
North India, a location geographically removed from the scene of
the revolt or border incidents. The bombing initiated direct hostil-
ities."' Indian troops marched into the Eastern wing of Pakistan
and, within six days, the Pakistani troops in East Bengal surren-
dered.
The Indian intervention has been acclaimed as the "clearest
case of forceful individual humanitarian intervention in this cen-
tury."11 7 It also has been condemned on the basis that, whatever
merit there may have been in intervening to suppress the obvious
barbarity, the intervention was a violation of the United Nations
norm prohibiting the use of force.' However, a consideration of
morally acceptable because of the intense revulsion against the brutal persecution of an
ethnic group." Conference Proceedings, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 114 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). Similar views based on the distinction between law and
morality were advanced by Falk, supra note 64, at 118.
11 A. MASCARENHAS. THE RAPE OF BANGLADESH (1971).
16 This fact makes it possible to justify the intervention as an act of self-defense as the
east wing was still a part of Pakistan.
.. Fonteyne, supra note 57, at 204. See also Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to
Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 197 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
116 See Franck & Rodley, supra note 104.
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the reasons advanced by the adherents of the second position indi-
cates the untenability of that view.
A major argument that intervention was illegitimate is centered
on the allegation that the intervention was not disinterested. This
position relates to the possibility of abuse and has been advanced
against the use of humanitarian intervention as a justification on
other occasions."" The argument was formulated by Franck and
Rodley in the following terms:
Of the six principal cases of post 1945 military interventions in
which humanitarian grounds, including various human rights
and the right of self-determination were advanced as justifica-
tion, four appear to be largely bogus-Hungary, the Dominican
Republic, Vietnam and Czechoslovakia-while only two-the
Congolese intervention and the Indian intervention in Bangla-
desh-arguably involve elements of real concern for human
rights. In both the latter cases, while the motive or rescue was
probably genuine, so were the self-interested political goals
achieved by the intervening states." °
Despite Indian claims to the contrary, 2' there is little doubt that
humanitarian concerns were not the primary factors behind the
intervention. The situation presented India with an opportunity to
weaken a traditional enemy and to attain supremacy in the region.
There were other factors that precipitated intervention. The In-
dian Bengalis in West Bengal, which bordered East Pakistan,
agitated for action by the Indian government. Refugees arrived in
enormous numbers" and their maintenance was causing India
considerable economic strain.'23 In addition, many of the refugees
were Hindus and their subjection to ill-treatment on the basis of
religion at the hands of Pakistani troops could have provoked
religious strife within the predominantly Hindu, but secular, In-
dia. However, as stated previously, the presence of motives of
self-interest should not detract from the validity of an interven-
tion that achieves the task of protecting human rights. In an im-
perfect world, self-interest alone induces conduct that may be
1"9 Consider, for example, the use of the doctrine to justify the intervention in the Congo
and the Dominican crises. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 104.
' &IL at 285-86.
,21 During the U.N. Security Council debates, the Indian delegate stated that "we have
on this particular occasion nothing but the purest motives: to rescue the people of Bengal
from .. .suffering." 26 U.N. SCOR (1606th mtg.) 1, 18, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1606 (1971).
'" Joyner, supra note 113; Marwah, India's Military Intervention in East Pakistan,
1971-1972 13 MoD. ASIAN STUD. 549 (1979).
'" The flood of refugees led to the charge that there was "economic agression."
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regarded as morally obligatory. That is made evident by the fact
that atrocities as grave as those perpetrated in Bangladesh have
not attracted military interventions.'24 The simple fact that no na-
tional interest was served by interference made many crises in
which there were enormous losses of lives pass without interven-
tion. On policy grounds, the existence of self-interest should not
affect the legality of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, at
least on occasions where political expediency coincides with the
existence of humanitarian grounds for intervention, human rights
may be protected. The prescription of Franck and Rodley would
mean that, in view of the inaction by the United Nations, the
world and India would have stood by and watched the massacre of
the Bengalis. That such a price must be paid to preserve the uni-
formity of a legal norm is unacceptable.
Another basis for disputing the ground of humanitarian inter-
vention in the Bangladesh crisis is the view that, in the absence of
permission from the international community, any intervention is
illegal. This argument, premised upon the existence of an effective
United Nations system, is stated by Franck and Rodley as follows:
"What distinguishes all six post-1945 cases from the earlier in-
stances is that each was undertaken without any prior sanction of
the international community, this despite the rise of the United
Nations system."'25 Unilateral intervention to uphold human
rights is illegal, according to Bowett, for similar reasons. How-
ever, if this is to be an effective criticism of an intervention simi-
lar to that in the Bangladesh crisis, it must be demonstrated that
the United Nations has provided effective machinery to prevent
gross violations of human rights.' Inaction of the United Nations
in the face of massive violations of human rights that have oc-
curred since its inception"= does not inspire confidence in the argu-
ment that the United Nations system has displaced any machinery
" Biafra provides an example. Brownlie cites massacre of Indonesian communists in 1965
and concludes that "the whole field is riven with political expediency and capriciousness."
Brownlie, supra note 59, at 224. A cynic might reply that this criticism could be leveled at
every field of international or domestic law.
' Franck & Rodley, supra note 104, at 286.
i Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self Defense, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 39, 45 (J. Moore ed. 1974). See also De Schutter, supra
note 105.
" Examples of violations include the Tibetan crisis, the massacre of the Indonesian com-
munists, racial problems in southern Africa, the Biafran civil war, Bangladesh, Vietnam,
and the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.
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for redress provided by the customary law."8 It could be argued that
approaches in the first instance must be made to the United Na-
tions, before any individual action is taken. The Indian conduct prior
to intervention supports this view. The Indian Prime Minister
visited several European states and the United States requesting
them to intercede in the crisis. Efforts were made at the United
Nations to resolve the crisis. The intervention was undertaken
only upon the failure of these efforts. The conduct of India may be
interpreted as an awareness of an obligation to set into motion the
United Nations machinery to deal with the situation and to alert the
international community so that it may exert pressure to achieve a
solution. Upon the failure of these alternatives, unilateral interven-
tion may be the only remedy.
Certain commentators stress that intervention in the Congo can
be distinguished from the intervention in Bangladesh. This dis-
tinction is made by Franck and Rodley,'1 who assume the legality
of the Congo operation and assert that the government of Tshombe
had invited the intervention, whereas the Bangladesh interven-
tion was against the established government. Furthermore, the
Congo intervention was designed to rescue a thousand hostages
who were foreign nationals. The Indian intervention was intended
to assist an alien people. Both principles, on the basis of which the
distinctions are made, depend on customary law. Acceptance of
their validity would enervate the general thesis supported by
Franck and Rodley that the paramountcy to be attached to article
2(4) and to the Charter system precludes resort to any remedy
outside the Charter.1 30
As to the first basis of distinction, if the invitation of the
government does in fact legitimize intervention, there must be a
determination of which party has control and the support of the
people. 31 In the case of Tshombe, there was considerable doubt as
to whether he had popular support or control. However, no doubt
existed in the case of the Awami League, which had overwhelm-
"28 In a survey of the United Nations attitude to the crisis, Salzburg remarked on the
primitive nature of the competence of the U.N. and its over-emphasis on article 2(7) and
suggested reconsideration of U.N. machinery to deal with human rights situations.
Salzburg, supra note 72.
"' Franck & Rodley, supra note 104, at 287-88.
It is possible to justify the position taken by Franck and Rodley that the two prin-
ciples on which they base their distinction flow from the notion of state sovereignty, which
underlies the U.N. system.
131 Customary international law used the degree of control as a basis for distinguishing
between insurgency and belligerency. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 252-55.
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ingly won the elections conducted under the auspices of the Paki-
stani army and had the constitutional right to form the govern-
ment of the whole of Pakistan. The support given by the Awami
League for the Indian intervention may appear more respectable
than the invitation of the Tshombe government as a justification
for the intervention in the Congo crisis. Where a minority has a
territorial base and, after a course of persecution, seeks to assert
its right to self-determination, it is artificial to argue that there is
a legitimate government in that territory. To do so would be to
place too great an emphasis on the notion of sovereignty and its
indestructibility. It would not accord with the factual situation
that the group in control of the territory should be regarded as
the legitimate government.132
The reason for the second distinction depends on the survival
under the Charter system of the customary law principle that a
state may intervene to rescue its nationals exposed to danger in
another country. However, the fact that those rescued in the Congo
were aliens who did not have a link recognized by law with the in-
tervening state and the argument that this distinguishes the Congo
intervention from that in Bangladesh proceeds from a concept of
sovereignty and ignores the ethnic and religious links that the
persecuted people may have with the intervening state. Hyde em-
phasized these links in the following passage:
It is conceivable that the tyrannical conduct of a state towards
its own subjects might directly affect numerous classes of sub-
jects of another state who were connected by blood with the vic-
tims of the ill-treatment. If the injury thus sustained was of
periodic occurrence and felt by large numbers of the population
of the outside state, the latter would doubtless assert the right
to intervene. In doing so, it would find justification for its ac-
tions in grounds closely analogous to those of self-defense.'
Various commentators state that the precedential value of the In-
dian intervention is minimal as it was an effort to assert the rights of
the majority against the minority. This point is not a criticism but an
effort to limit the scope of the use of the Indian intervention as a
precedent by pointing out that the Bengalis formed the overwhelm-
ing majority in the United Pakistan and that the party which they
had supported had the constitutional right to form the government
1 Id. at 268-69.
" Hyde, Intervention in Theory and Practice, 6 ILL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1911) [Illinois Law
Review is now called Northwestern Law Review].
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for the whole of Pakistan.13' This argument is based on numerical
factors rather than on principle."' The principle involved is the
protection of a group from those who wield power over it. The
significant element is power, not numbers.
Because the major objections to the Indian intervention in
Bangladesh are lacking, one may conclude that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention justifies the Indian action. The incident
provides a precedent on which rules limiting the exercise of the
doctrine could be formulated. First, as in the case of the Congo
crisis, there was an acceptance on the part of India that peaceful
methods of solving the problem must be exhausted. The Indian
diplomatic efforts prior to the intervention indicate the accept-
ance of the norm. Second, the intervention should be undertaken
unilaterally only upon the failure of United Nations machinery to
deal adequately with the situation. Third, there must exist the
strong possibility of danger to the intervening country, or, in the
alternative, some nexus with the repressed people. Fourth, there
must be minimum interference with the internal administration of
the country or with the establishment of governmental machinery
in the new state, if the creation of one is necessary to protect the
human rights of the minority.
The absence of condemnation of the Indian intervention by the
international community amounts to a condonation of intervention
in a civil war brought about by the consistent violation of a
minority's right to equality and its consequent claim to self-
determination. As Farer has stated, "where ... groups are iden-
tified on the basis of hereditary or morally intolerable criteria and
experience intense deprivation with respect to most societal
values . . . there is a morally irresistible case for intervention.""M
The precedent provided by the Bangladesh crisis has made the
law congruent with the morally favored position.
V. POST-BANGLADESH INTERVENTIONS
Since the Bangladesh crisis, there have been several military in-
terventions. All of them, except the intervention of Tanzania in
Uganda, have been justified on the basis of customary principles
of international law other than humanitarian intervention. The
[U Ved Nanda, supra note 113, at 323-24.
"' Dinstein, supra note 8, at 104; K. MISRA, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE INDO-
PAKISTANI CONFLICT, 1971, at 138 (1973).
IN Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 157 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
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French interventions in the African states of Chad and Western
Sahara in 1978 were justified on the basis of invitations by the
legitimate governments of these states."l 7 The French interven-
tion in May of 1978 in Zaire was justified both on the basis of an
invitation and on the need to save European lives." The Russian
intervention in Afghanistan in December of 1979 and the Viet-
namese intervention in Cambodia were also justified on the basis
of invitation by the purportedly legitimate governments. In the
case of the Cambodian intervention, which secured the ouster of
the Pol Pot government, there was a basis for advancing
humanitarian intervention as a justification in light of the fact
that atrocities committed by that government were universally
condemned. Yet, the fact that such justification was not advanced
suggests that the international community would not accept an ex-
planation based on humanitarian grounds when political reasons for
the intervention grossly outweigh humanitarian ones. Nor would
such a justification be made, when, as in the case of Vietnam, it
would be futile to do so. The much feared abuse of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention has not materialized, even if account is
taken of the theory that international legal norms are only ex post
facto fabrications to support actions already taken in a country's
national interest. 139 It is important to note that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was not regarded as a proper justifica-
tion by Vietnam for the intervention in Cambodia, although ef-
forts have been made to so justify it.
The only intervention that went uncondemned by the interna-
tional community was the intervention into Uganda by
Tanzania. 10 The demise of Idi Amin, who had compiled an in-
famous record for violations of human rights, was greeted with ap-
plause rather than condemnation, illustrating worldwide approval
of the downfall of the regime. The new government, established
with the help of the Tanzanian troops, was recognized within days
by many states. As Burrows argued,
if Tanzania was courageous enough to do what several other
states would have wished to do and if it was acting as the "inter-
national conscience" in replacing a regime which most govern-
ments believed to be abhorrent and whose domestic policies
1 For an account of the French interventions, see Hollick, French Intervention in Africa
in 1978, 35 WORLD TODAY 71 (1979).
18' Le Monde, May 23, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
K. HOLSTI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 415 (1972).
"' Burrows, Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda" Some Aspects, 35 WORLD TODAY 306
(1979).
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violated all the international legal standards relating to human
rights and fundamental freedoms, then its actions should be sup-
ported explicitly by that international community and by its
law.141
Justification for the aborted American raid on Iran to secure
the release of diplomats held as hostages in Teheran may be based
on grounds other than protection of nationals abroad.
Humanitarian reasons could be found to justify the raid, which
technically amounted to an attack. Justifications for the American
raid would have even greater validity than the Israeli raid on
Entebbe, due to the fact that the American hostages, as
diplomats, were entitled to the special protection of Iran.
In view of the many post-Charter interventions justified on the
basis of humanitarian grounds, it is a bit late to argue that such in-
terventions are illegal under the Charter. A more realistic ap-
proach is to devise objective criteria, which would control abuse
and ensure the dominance of objective, rather than subjective,
criteria. Objective criteria include (1) persistent violation of the
human rights of a distinct group; (2) refusal to desist from such a
course of conduct despite diplomatic efforts; (3) refusal to yield to
pressure to desist from such conduct despite intervention by the
United Nations and other nongovernmental organs; and, (4) ex-
istence of a climate of world opinion which would condone an in-
tervention on humanitarian grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is evidence of an evolution of a system of minority protec-
tion in international law through the extension of the principle of
self-determination to include a right of secession in a minority
possessing a definite territorial base. Such a right arises only as a
sanctioning right in a situation where the right to equality of the
minority group is denied consistently by the state. The right to
secession is secured further by the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention, which permits an outside state to intervene unilaterally
in a situation where the minority's right to secession is repressed
violently by the state. Secession may be resorted to only under
special conditions. Certain of the requirements are (1) that prior
efforts be made to solve the internal conflict peacefully; ' (2) that
"' The end of the rule of Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic passed
without condemnation for similar reasons.
"' This could be done by devolution of power (as in Scotland), by granting limited
autonomy (Basque regions of Spain), or by creating a state within a federal system (the
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where pressure cannot be brought to solve the situation intern-
ally, diplomatic and other international efforts be made; (3) that
United Nations machinery be set in motion; and (4) that, failing all
these measures, intervention by a concerned state is permissible.
After an intervention has begun, precedents illustrate acceptance
of further limitations, including: (1) that the intervention, to be
justified on humanitarian grounds, be surgical, having as its
primary purpose the ending of the violations of the rights of the
minority; (2) that troops be withdrawn; and (3) that there be no
participation in the formation of a new state created as a result of
the intervention.
This scheme of minority protection to end internal colonialism
has developed in modern international law. The scheme may be
objected to on several grounds. An initial objection is that permit-
ting a right to secession would dissolve the present international
order based on a system of sovereign states. '43 However, it should
be recognized that a consequence of the momentum achieved by
the international movement for protection of human rights has
been considerable erosion of the notion of state sovereignty. At
any rate, the suggested system accords with the preservation of
an order based on states to the extent that the possibility of the
dissolution of a state can be obviated by the recognition and protec-
tion of minority rights.14' Further arrangements such as the
regional devolution of power, the creation of states with limited
autonomy, and the creation of a new federal state within an
existing federation are techniques that would diminish the validity
Nagas in India). It is accepted in the law of human rights that prior to an international
forum being seized of the matter, there must be an exhaustion of local remedies. See
Mohammed Kamal v. United Kingdom (application No. 8378/78), decided on May 19, 1980,
by the European Commission of Human Rights. Also, where a declaration under article 41
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is made and the optional protocol to the Cove-
nant is signed by a state, the Human Rights Committee has the right to receive individual
petitions against violations of human rights in the signatory state. However, such com-
plaints would be entertained by the Committee only if local remedies provided by the law
of the state had been exhausted. For formulation of criteria that would validate interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds, see Lillich, supra note 57, at 344-51. See also J. MOORE, LAW
AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 185 (1972).
"u D. LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (1967).
The option is with the state. The Indian Foreign Minister stated in the Security Coun-
cil during the Bangladesh crisis that "it was not India which sought to dismember Pakistan.
It was the oppressive regime of West Pakistan which had dismembered Pakistan by its ac-
tions." 9 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 34 (1972). In any event, once internal strife has become a
civil war, it is futile to expect outside states not to intervene. Modelski, The International
Relations of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 14, 20-24 (J. Rosenau
ed. 1964).
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of a minority's claims to self-determination. The strength of a claim
would decline in direct proportion to the extent of the constitu-
tional protection afforded the minority. The possibility of secession
is not a threat to a state not bent on a policy of discrimination. On
the other hand, a state that constantly subjects its minorities to
abuse should not be allowed to take refuge in the inviolability of
the international order of states. The dissolution of such a state
would promote order by removing a problem that would otherwise
remain as a constant threat to peace. By ensuring international
concern only in circumstances where an absence of constitutional
protection is evidenced, the system that has been outlined not only
promotes the securing of rights of minorities through internal
guarantees but also provides deterrence to states in the form of an
accepted sanction.
A second objection is that if intervention in the circumstances
described were permitted, frivolous claims would be made to
justify interventions. However, frivolous claims can be discounted
by analyses of accepted criteria, such as the extent of violation of
human rights, the willingness of the parent state to restore
values, and the viability of a new entity, if one is to be created.
Secessions seldom succeed unless the international community is
satisfied that some objective criteria requiring the creation of a
new state exist.
The Charter system has devoted little attention to minority
protection. In the absence of a Charter system that ensures the
protection of minorities, a distinct scheme needs to be evolved.
This article suggests that such a scheme has evolved on the basis
of the principles of self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion. The task for the future remains the refinement of that
scheme so that abuses may be prevented rather than the ex-
istence of the principles denied.
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